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Abstract 
SUBJECTS, AGENTS, OR COLLECTIVES? 
THE DISCOURSE OF YOUTH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Ibrahim Bello-Kano* 
To become what one is, one must not have the 
faintest idea what one is 
-Friedrich Nietzsche. Ecce Homo, p. 254. 
The present paper argues that the term "youth", which is traditionally used to 
refer both to young people of a certain age bracket and to a time of life between 
childhood and maturit;~ has acquired distinctive yet contradictmy meanings since 
the J 9tl' centwy, and that the categmy of people, individuals, or persons that the 
concept describes or purports to analyze (the so-called young people, teenagers, 
pubescents, adolescents) may be regarded as subjects in the philosophical sense of 
being persons capable of intentional behaviour and to whom intentional predicates 
(beliefs and desires) can be ascribed but not, however, as a collective agent, with 
the capacity for goal-directed activit;1 (such as, for example, political, social, or 
national transformation), in spite of the shift in the use of the concept from a singular 
to a collective noun. The paper argues further that the term "youth" is a vacuous 
concept, and thus lacks any philosophic or analytic significance or explanatory 
value in social theory and, especially, in philosophy, and that the discourse of youth 
which deploys the concept can only sustain the "politics of collective singularity" 
whereby a singular or a single collective subject or a parasitic structure usurps, 
or feeds on, the activity and capacity of empirical subjects (young people). The 
paper draws out the philosophic and practical-political implications of its central 
arguments- namely that young people, teenagers, pubescents, or adolescents 
those presumably described by the collective noun, "youth", do not, and cannot, 
articulate a coherent group - or age-based beliefs, desires, reasons, and action; 
cannot represent (or be the collective agency of) definite, historically-specific 
political-economic interests or relations in society; and, that, to the same extent, 
cannot be an agency of, or fm; and indeed cannot be mobilized fm; any form of 
enduring political action or social or national transformation. 
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1. Introduction 
That there is something, some transcendentally real presence, some 
group of entities, collectively called youth is widely believed. Whether as term or 
concept, youth purports to describe a specific set of human subjects (adolescents, 
teenagers, and young people in general), a process (a time of life that is neither 
childhood nor adulthood, that is, somewhere in-between), and a transition (the 
period between childhood and maturity). Yet the actual age bracket for youth is 
notoriously variable: for the United Nations and the World Bank, for example, 
it is 15-24 years, while the Commonwealth Youth Programme specifies 15-29 
years; and for many countries the figure varies from 13-18, 20-25, and even 12-20 
years. The Nigerian National Council on Youth Development defines youth as "all 
young males and females aged 18-30 which are citizens of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria" (National Youth Policy of Nigeria, p. 4)1• 
What is more, virtually every country and multilateral institution has 
got a "Youth Policy" and a "Youth Action Plan", as can be seen in the case of 
the Nigerian National Youth Policy, The ECOWAS Commission Youth Policy, 
African Youth Charter, Commonwealth Youth Charter, United Nations World 
Programme of Action for Youth, and so on. In 2006, the Obasanjo Administration 
even established the Ministry of Youth Development. The Nigerian Youth Policy, 
for example, takes as axiomatic the view that youth is a natural kind (young people, 
the young), what it calls "the greatest assets that any nation can have ... the future 
leaders ... the greatest investment for a country's development ... a vital resource" 
(p. 1). These statements about youth, from those of the Nigerian National Youth 
Policy to the United Nations World Programme of Action for Youth, all assume 
that young people exist (as natural or naturalized entities, assets, and resources), 
and that the word or term "youth" describes a concept, that of entities, assets, 
resources, and human organisms (young people of a certain age-bracket). Indeed 
all of those institutions conceptualize young people, or youth, as the "future" (in 
terms of human biological and social reproduction) ofhuman civilization, not just 
of specific countries, communities, or societies. All speak of"empowering" young 
people in terms of political, social, economic, and development efforts; all pledge 
to put youth at the centre of national, regional, and international development. 
It is thus clear that some notion, idea, or concept of youth is discernible 
in the discursive practices of many institutions, from the state, the family, and 
society to the market economy, whether it is a government department concerned 
with "Youth Development", or "Youth Employment'', the legal system or penal 
code concerned with "Youth Crime", a traditional family anxiety about "youth 
behaviour", or "transition to adulthood", or market advertising concerned with 
"Youth Culture". However, it will be shown below that the term youth is, and 
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describes, a more or less contradictory and unstable set of entities or natural kinds 
(teenagers, adolescents, young men and women, "future leaders", human resources, 
the young, etc.), and that these entities are, in the end, not meaningful things in 
themselves, not units or entities given in nature, but an absence, a difference (a 
differential network), rather than a reference (a presence). 
2. Analytical Framework 
This paper seeks to put epistemological and ontological pressure on the 
concept of youth (as a collective noun) in order to determine how far it can go, 
and how much it can do, paradigmatically and causally. The paper aspires to be a 
philosophical critique concerned with the adequacy of concepts, the consistency 
(and rationality) of propositions, and the validity of arguments. This form of 
critique is a kind of explanatory critique which aims, in general, to identify the 
presence of causally significant absences in conceptual schemes, what cannot be 
articulated or done in a specific language or conceptual scheme, and what is said or 
done or presupposed by means of such language or system. This form of critique 
may be called "meta-critique" in that it strives to unite the criticism of concepts 
and their conditions of possibility; it illuminates or explains conceptual errors 
by seeking to work towards the elimination of the condition, action, or practice 
that informs, conditions, sustains, or necessitates those conceptual errors. Here, 
the critique passes immediately and unconditionally to a negative evaluation or 
judgement of the objects (ideologies, politics, social relations, etc.) which make 
such conceptually or cognitively defective conceptual forms necessary. 2 
Thus on the terms of meta-critique, while the meaning of the word 
"youth" (as a collective noun) actually depends, as we have seen, on reference 
to a set of circumscribed entities (young people, for example), it is nevertheless 
the repeatability of the word (what is meant by it by those who use the word 
as a descriptive or analytical term or concept) is not something that attaches in 
a causal relationship to meaningful things or strings of things (to entities given 
in nature) but to a network of traces (that is, the differences in the entities held 
to be true of youth, namely assets, people, resources, the future, potentialities; 
etc.). To use Saussure's opt-cited phrase, "in language there are only differences 
without positive terms [reference]" (1974: 121). Now this suggests that it is the 
repeatability (the meaning) of the word "youth" that is a condition of its being a 
socially meaningful word; for only by being part of a chain of possible repeatings 
can the word have meaning at all. It is this that establishes the field of difference 
(the need for the word to describe more than just young people but their attributes, 
and other classes of things, as we have seen) that confers on the word its meaning· 
(either as a sign, a signifier, or as a conceptual signified). That is, the activity of 
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conferring meaning on the word "youth" (or what it purports to describe) owes its 
intelligibility not to a reference (a presence; young people as empirical subjects), a 
sameness (all young people) or determinacy (the biological, physiological, social, 
or cultural irreducibility of young people, for example). The wider point is this: 
there can be no movement from (word, concept, term) to the real thing (some 
immediate presence, some unity called "young people" or "adolescents", to which 
the "real thing" now stands). A concrete illustration of this is the differential ways 
in which the word "youth" has figured in "statements" ("policy") about young 
people or what we may call "the discourse of youth", where, indeed, we find no 
relation of reference that anchors the word "youth" to things or entities in the 
world, or what, following Derrida (1976) we would call the structural relation to 
a presence that is always elsewhere. 
3. Discourses of Youth 
As is usual with concepts and descriptive tenns, the word "youth", which 
is variously deployed with reference to a distinct category of individuals, to the 
time of life between childhood and maturity, or to a person within that time of 
life, has had shifting and mutable uses, and has acquired, even in the academic 
literature, distinct yet contradictory meanings, at least since the 19'11 century (Gillis 
1974; Fritz 2005). This section examines in detail the specific conceptualizations 
of the word "youth", and the specific discourses (meta-statements) that "objectify" 
the word, and the concept of youth as an empirical subject. 
The term "youth" elides three overlapping situations. First, the biological-
physiological aspects of the age-process, variously described as "puberty" and 
"adolescence", which covers persons in the 13-19 years bracket3• But in this sense, 
"youth" (rather than puberty, for example) describes a sociological situation, 
rather than the physical-biological changes involved in human development (Fritz 
1985). 
Second, the transitional stage between childhood and adulthood, 
described by the term "young man". But in this case, "youth" describes a "stage 
of incompletion", a transitional process, rather than the vexatious social and sub-
cultural spaces which young people are said to be likely to occupy due, in part, to 
what Aristotle would regard as their lack of experience of particulars. 
Third, is a situation described by Fritz (2005: 380) as the "rebalancing of 
youth's positive and negative connotation"; that is, a re-description of the negative 
connotation (i.e. ignorance and recklessness ofa youth) and the positive ones (the 
flexibility, vitality, and freedom of young people) to mean that youth is not only a 
specific determinacy (biological-physiological-psychological changes, objective 
time, definite patterns, and limitations) but also indeterminacy and incompletion (a 
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movement towards complexity and valuable complication, a transition to a higher 
order, etc.). In this sense, youth no longer marks the transition from childhood 
to adulthood, or even a specific or actual age (e.g. "teenager", "childhood" or 
"puberty" or "adolescence") but a free-play of style, a free self-definition, a life-
style, or, in fact, the social institution of self-creation and self-making4. 
It was partly in response to those situations the term "youth" had to 
change, and did change, from a singular noun (e.g. "a youth") to a collective noun 
("youth"), which now describes not only specific persons or individuals within a 
particular stage or time of life but also a state of mind, a life style, so that even 
adults and older people (in their mid-life or after) can be young as a matter of life-
style or feel young as a matter of personal choice. 
What is significant about all this is that it is now no longer possible to 
distinguish clearly and decisively those shifting and contradictory meanings of 
the term "youth" in either the public understanding of the term or its analytical 
implications in the academic literature. For example, Gillis (1974) has argued 
that many urban societies across the world saw the transition from childhood to 
adulthood as fractious and problematic; and that this awareness intensified as 
more and more families moved from rural to urban areas, and as the permanent 
revolution of modernity and modernization imposed massive pressures on personal 
identity and traditional modes of living. And with the intensification of the facts of 
spatial and technological urbanization, with the development of industrialization, 
bureaucracy, professional work, the market, universal education, and time-
consciousness, all of which combined to disrupt the normative and socializing 
function of the family and other traditional units, youth came to describe social 
dislocation and problematic identity, crime, urban alienation, and undesirable 
behaviour such as drug addiction and sexual hedonism (which today includes 
anxiety about youth and HIV I AIDS infection). 
The usual response from society and the state was to see "youth" as 
a social problem which required resolution within specific institutions such a~ 
"Youth Courts", "Youth Prisons" (also called Juvenile Courts or Juvenile Prisons) 
and "Youth Services" (for correctional and counselling measures within the wider 
institutions of social control). All of this means, of course, that the term "youth", 
implied, in those contexts at least, the possibility of what Fritz (2005:381) calls "a 
permanent state of irresponsibility" (as may be illustrated by the Nigerian situation 
of the reckless driving by commercial motorcyclists who are mostly young rural 
migrants). Nevertheless, within this institutional response to "youth'', there also 
exists, and has existed, a positive affirmation of youthful activity or youth self-
making. This is conveyed by such terms as "youth clubs", "youth workers", "youth 
opportunities'', "Young Farmers'', "Young Turks", or "Young Conservatives", 
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and in Nigeria by the National Youth Service). All of this collectively affirms 
the universal image of youth as a desirable, transcendentally benign collective 
existence. Yet even here, "youth" describes a masculine category, in two 
contradictory ways, namely a male-working class (which excludes women), with 
associations of gender-based leisure and work spaces and class resistance. Here 
youth is signified by their male youth sub-culture, and by "their deviant and often 
bizarre style of dress a way of making sense of their marginal position in society" 
(Billington et al 1991: 132. See also, on this, Hall & Jafferson 1976; Mungham 
and Person 1976; Hebdige, 1979). Another is the positive image of youth as a form 
of desirable consumption and an attractive subjectivity, a normality hinged on 
market-exchange, and in young persons' transition to adult responsibility through 
work and cultural exchange. 
According to Fass (1977), it was the public anxiety about consumption 
and (desirable) market-exchange relations, most specifically in concerns about 
"hedonism" and unbridled consumption, that a new conception of youth emerged 
in the late 201h century. This signalled a further shift, in many affluent urban 
cultures from a conception of youth as a problem of order (which the state should 
tackle through institutional mediation) to one of youth as the epitome of existential 
autonomy, self-indulgence, pleasure, and desirable physical qualities such as 
health, beauty, vitality, freshness, and market choice in terms of consumer goods 
such as cigarette, designer cars, clothes, and shoes. This is what Fritz (2005: 381) 
calls youth as "a market position". In this sense, youth has become a symbolic 
and aesthetic position, a life-style. It describes, and relates to, the modern, 
even "post-modern", self-fashioning, and the aesthetics of identity nurtured by 
consumer capitalism, market-advertising fantasy, and, especially, Western forms 
of consumerist chic, for example, obsession with youthfulness, youth culture, 
youthful body, sexual attractiveness, sexual virility, health, vitality, physical 
beauty and public glamour - in dress, speech, gesture, and personal appearance 
in general. 
This notion of youth has become, despite continuing state interest in youth 
as a public or social policy (youth crime and delinquency, youth unemployment, 
etc.), the dominant late 201h and early 21'1 centu1y conception of youth (as a 
collective noun). Consumer capitalism has re-defined and re-described youth to 
mean" consumers"- the target for fashion clothes, cosmetics, computer games, and 
sports merchandise. Advertisements of virtually everything the market produces 
(household equipment, cars, clothes, food, drinks, cigarettes) now promote the 
idea that all consumers are, or should by implication be, young people, or youth 
as such - upwardly mobile, fashionable, glamorous, and responsible (i.e. able 
and willing to be all those desirable life-long consumer identifications). 
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It may in fact be argued that youth as a model of consumption (rather than 
as a problem of order or a problem for social policy) has become the new ideal 
of subjectivity in late modernity. This is the case because virtually all the actually 
existing youth policies we have seen, from the Nigerian Youth Policy to that of 
the United Nations, stress, as their guiding principles, goals, and objectives, the 
integration of youth into national reconstruction and development. The Nigerian 
Youth Policy, for example, seeks to, in its own words, "put the development and 
participation of young people at the centre of national development efforts ... to 
mobilize their potentialities ... take charge of their own destiny [and become] 
active participants in the shaping of the political and economic destiny of [their] 
nation" (pp. 1-2). From Nigerian Youth Policy to that of the United Nations, this 
imperative of youth involvement is no other than the rhetoric of the many facts 
and faces of the neo-liberal philosophy of capitalist development through the 
twin programmes of free market and liberal democracy, and their accompanying 
rhetoric of human rights. 
It is thus fair to conclude, on the basis of the preceding discussion, that youth 
in the present circumstances describes contradictions (in the conceptualization 
of young people) rather than the problem of transition (within the time of life) 
of young people. But before we examine this issue in detail, let us consider the 
problem of whether the word "youth" does indeed capture the metaphysical 
complexity of young people. Now young people exist in all societies, despite the 
fact that people are continuously being born. Do young people, it may be asked, 
view, conceptualize, or identify, themselves as young people, or, in this case, as 
youth? Young people do indeed form a sort of empirical subject; that is, both as 
human organisms and as persons. The question is whether their being persons 
indicates their metaphysical integrity as a collective, which the collective noun 
"youth" describes or identifies. 
4. Intentional Predicates: Personhood 
The preceding discussion indicates that the items we call youth, or that 
are designated as youth in our culture, only exist in what we have referred to 
as a chain of possible repeatings within language and meaning. That is, as the 
multivalent uses of the word or concept of "youth" have shown, the word youth 
acquires its sense or meaning by being "repeated" at many levels. And as has been 
shown in the preceding pages, the word has never had, or in fact never acquired, a 
semantic determinacy, or a sameness of meaning; for as we have seen in the case 
of the uses, senses, and meanings (significations) of the notion of youth, there 
have not been, neither are there existing, a set or sets of ideal semantic entities 
from which to derive this sameness of meaning (i.e. the ontological identity of 
youth as a structure ofreference to a real thing, namely young people). 
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The question, then, is whether youth does have the metaphysical depth 
or personal agency of real people; and whether, indeed, youth is a determinate 
presence, with a secure metaphysical foundation and integrity. In other words, is 
youth self-posting? We can answer this question at two levels, that of"intentional 
behaviour" and of"subjectivity and agency". 
Any entity can be regarded as a person, with the capacity of person hood, 
if, according to Dennett (1981: 269-71; 281-85) it can meet the following 
conditions: 
I. Rationality (attitudinal and behavioural) 
11. Intentionality (intentional predicates such as beliefs and desires can be 
ascribed to it) 
iii. The attitude taken towards it (the stance adopted with respect to it) 
iv. It is capable of reciprocating in some way 
v. It is capable of verbal communication (dependent on possession of 
language) 
vi. It is conscious in some special way (i.e. it is alive, not dead, and is aware 
of having engaged in actions for which it can be held responsible). 
The first difficulty we should raise is whether we can ascribe attitudinal 
and behavioural rationality to the collective noun, youth. We can always ascribe 
beliefs and desires (intentionality) to persons or people because we can assign 
a sense to their utterances or language-use and to their observable behaviour 
(which may typically admit of more than one interpretation). The problem is 
how to know which beliefs and desires to ascribe to persons. Dennett (1981: 19) 
proposes that "we get round the 'privacy' of beliefs and desires by recognizing 
that in general anyone's beliefs and desires must be those he 'ought to have' given 
the circumstances". But this typically requires the person having some causal 
and ontological irreducibility since it also requires that the person is capable of 
changing her beliefs to ensure, for example, that her beliefs are true, at least in a 
minimal sense (attitudinal rationality); and that the person is also capable of acting 
in the light of beliefs and desires (behavioural rationality). Only when this is the 
case can a person be said to be rational, and capable of "reflexive monitoring", 
her being aware of her "own-states of awareness" during her activity; that is, her 
capacity to monitor the monitoring of her activity. 
Now it can easily be seen that youth is not, in the senses established 
in the preceding argument, a person. Since the term (as a concept and as a sign 
of presence) gathers and groups together amorphous, discrepant, and mutually 
exclusive "semantic" strings (a chain of possible repeatings; a chain of signifiers ), 
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it lacks the capacity, even the possibility, of a reflexive monitoring of its own 
intervention in the material or social world. It is even more difficult to ascribe 
intentional predicates to youth, since it is not intentional under such analytical terms 
as retrospection (retrospective commentary upon its actual or imagined activity in 
the world). As Bhaskar (1979: 104) would argue, "any entity X that lacked the 
capacity to refer to its own states of consciousness (and to interiorize references 
to itself in the third person) could not use these states of consciousness for the 
production and communication of infom1ation". This is the rational significance 
of Dennett's conditions of personhood, namely intentionality, reciprocity, 
language, and consciousness; for these not only specify the necessary conditions 
of personhood (agency) but also the necessary conditions for any discursive 
(non-intuitive) intelligence. To use a fonnulation of Bhaskar 's, the facts of both 
"intervention" and "commentary" are "always the situated doings of agents at 
places in time" (1979: 104). But this is, paradigmatically and structurally, denied 
to youth as a transcendental entity; for as a collective noun, it lacks intentionality, 
reciprocity, reflexivity, language, and consciousness - for these are the attributes 
of persons, or what we may call "individual human subjects". 
This is the case because only individual human organisms have any 
metaphysical integrity in the light of the conditions of personhood specified 
above. The upshot of the argument is that any human person has, or possesses, this 
metaphysical integrity, which, in substance, amounts to capacity: for any person 
as person shares this capacity, irrespective of age, ethnicity, gender, sex, life-style, 
disposition, ideology, beliefs, identity, or her place in society, or in the relations 
of production (class). In other words, youth as such does not possess some 
separate set of intentional predicates, or intentionality, from any objectively-given 
human organism. Thus on the basis of what is called the Principle ofHumanity5, 
individual young people could be persons but not youth (as a transcendental entity 
or as a collective noun, each of which implies the existence of a collective subject 
which, if we would only uncover or identify its presence would fix its "authorial" 
meaning for us). 
5. Subjects, Agents, Collectivities 
Individual human beings may be defined in terms of their tendencies 
and powers - as agents who act on the basis of beliefs and reasons, which are 
themselves tendencies in the real world. Now the question is whether youth has an 
identifiable action on the basis of its position, interest, beliefs, and reasons. To ask 
the question in another way: is youth an agent (a causally efficacious subject)? 
First of all, only human beings, as intentional beings, and as beings 
to whom intentional predicates can be ascribed, are subjects. For intentional 
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predicates, rationality and language, make human beings subjects. On this view, 
"the subject is what speaks" (Belsey 2005: 40). This is why for subjects, social 
action is ultimately connected to the subject's speech (given the centrality of 
intentional predicates in specifying personhood and, by extension, agency). On 
the basis of this insight, we should have no difficulty identifying agency at this 
level - the subject's verbal behaviour, which can, excepting deeper philosophical 
difficulties in terms of inferring meaning without belief', be straightforwardly read 
off any evidence for it (in the form of authorship and linguistic and discursive 
responsibility). Despite arguments on the basis of the so-called Principle of 
Charity, according to which we can take "the fact that speakers of a language hold 
a sentence to be trne (under observed circumstances) as prima facie evidence that 
the sentence is true under those circumstances" (Davidson 1984: 148), youth has 
no speech or language or sentences or a fabric of sentences that could specify its 
agency status; for youth has no utterances that we could interpret as indicating its 
beliefs (and reasons). This is why we cannot have any reason to count youth (either 
as creature or presence) as rational and as having beliefs, or, to borrow a metaphor 
of Davidson's, as saying anything. For example, note that youth as agency does 
not speak, and is silent in the discourses of Youth Policy, from the Nigerian to 
the United Nations'. Someone else speaks for youth in these discourses. Thus 
on this minimal sense at least, we cannot say that youth is an agent since we 
cannot interpret its speech, utterances, or verbal communication chiefly because 
interpretation involves ascribing beliefs (and reasons, which are themselves beliefs, 
and which may themselves be true or false) to agents (and who, by necessity, are 
attitudinally and behaviourally rational). Thus, unless we assume that "agents are 
rational, their doings and sayings are unintelligible" (Callinicos 1989: 114). This 
is the transcendental argument (on the basis of specific individual agency) against 
the assumption in the discourses of youth and national and international youth 
policies and programmes that youth is an agent, and possesses the attributes of 
agency (even on the basis of individual agency to which beliefs and desires can be 
ascribed on the basis of the Principle of Humanity, to which Dennett's six-point 
condition tacitly refers). 
Nevertheless, as we have seen above, youth is sometimes seen as 
describing the structural and organizational capacities of young people (which is 
signalled by the many "youth wings" of political parties, the youth cadres of many, 
especially rnral, communities, the UN, ECOWAS Youth Charter, and the Nigerian 
Youth Policy, etc). In these discourses and their operational organs, youth is re-
described as a collective agent (or agency). But what happens if youth is, as argued 
previously, not an individual agent; is it, then, or can it be, a collective agent? 
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This question turns upon the structural-organizational capacities of 
collective agents, their consciousness of themselves, and their sense of common 
identity (as a collectivity). Individual agents may form a collectivity in order to 
pursue their desires, reasons, interests, and objectives. Typically, a collectivity 
seeks to achieve some goal or goals, pursue its interests, and seeks to remold 
society in the light of those goals, interests, or objectives. Thus a "collective 
exists where persons co-ordinate their actions because they believe themselves 
to have a common identity" (Callinicos 1989: 135). Such identity may be, again, 
a set of predicates designating properties unique or special to such individuals, 
namely class position, or some position in productive relations, or the social 
relations of society (which could indicate social power of sorts, for example, 
ethnic organization, political or administrative position in the state apparatus, etc). 
As Callinicos argues, unless individuals "believe themselves to have something 
in common and treat this as the basis of their collective action, they are not a 
collectivity" (135). We may say, then, that the unicity of young people as subjects 
and agents is not present in the concept of youth. 
So in what sense, then, can we say, for example, that youth forms, or 
describes, a class position (or a definite identical position in the production 
relations)? But note, following Giddens (1981: 111-13), that while class awareness 
does not have to acknowledge the existence of class position, class consciousness 
does have to. The wider point is that it is class consciousness alone in the form 
of what he calls class identity, conflict consciousness, and revolutionary class-
consciousness or "the recognition of the possibility of an overall reorganization in 
the institutional medication of power ... and a belief that such a reorganization can 
be brought out through class action" (111-13), which defines class as a collectivity. 
This is not to correlate class consciousness with the actual existence of a class but 
merely to suggest that the collective action of individual agents, the collectivity, 
is a necessary condition for class struggle. But this is precisely what youth lacks: 
young people qua young people do not share identical class positions, and for this 
reason cannot, and do not normally, have a collective consciousness (a "collective 
youth consciousness"). Young people qua young people have no sense whatsoever 
of the "recognition of the possibility ofan overall reorganization in the institutional 
mediation of power"; or a belief that "such a reorganization can be brought about 
through class action"; or even collective youth action, on the basis of a "collective 
youth consciousness". (But even if individual "youth" agents could imagine this, 
it would not be a realistic possibility, but, perhaps, only a negative utopia)7. 
And in a situation where youth describes an amorphous collection of 
individuals without a common language, common interests, beliefs, reasons, 
and culture; and scattered across ethnic, gender, class, religious, communal and 
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national identifications, it cannot be said to hold the promise of, or prospects for, 
what Mann ( 1986: 219) calls "the capacity for extensive organization" (as, say, the 
working class or the bourgeoisie is capable of). Thus on the basis of this insight, 
the following implications are evident: 
1. youth is structurally incapable of organization by reason of its own 
collective interests 
2. youth has no identifiable structural capacities whatsoever 
3. youth is incapable of social action (as a collective) 
4. youth is incapable of social consciousness (a universal "collective youth 
consciousness") 
5. youth is discursively incapable of accessing its own "collective" 
awareness 
6. youth is incapable of what Mann calls "intensive power", the ability for 
tight organization and command based on a very high level of collective 
mobilization and commitment (1986:7). 
Moreover, without the possibility of "value-consensus", internal 
consistency in values, a sense of an alternative to the present, a vision of collective 
action as identity; without a sense of itself as a conscious actor in the world, a 
modem subjectivity in its own right, autonomous and sure of itself; without any 
sense ofits social identity as a subject; without, in the end, any sense ofa "practical 
consciousness'', youth is, and remains, a metaphysical fiction (since youth has no 
collective interests or positions that it is compelled, paradigmatically, structurally, 
and causally, to defend). Even more important: youth lacks any ontological 
integrity (since it is not even a social group, what, borrowing an analogy of 
Gramsci's (1971: 333) we might call the "active people-in-the-mass"). Rather, 
youth is, at best, a patient in the discourses of the state and other institutional youth 
programmes, a "raw material" in the discourses of Family-Adult institutions; and, 
is properly speaking, no more than a "statement", a discourse of heterogeneous 
institutional-cultural elements. 
6. Productions of Discourse 
We have seen above how youth is the production of not only the signifier 
"youth'', specifically the biological-physiological aspect of the age-process 
("puberty"), the transitional stage between childhood and adulthood ("young 
man"), a state of incompletion in social and cultural space, a life style within the 
social institutions of Romantic self-creation, a state of mind, a problem of order (a 
social dislocation and problematic identity requiring public or social-institutional 
policy), and as a market position (youth as an ideal of consumption). Now all 
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those "positions" may have their intrinsic language (or codes), or a symbolic and 
symbolizing system, which "fixes" the meaning of the so-called entities they over-
determine. The way this "language" or "symbolizing mechanism" divides up young 
men and women as empirical subjects, for example, is, and becomes, the meaning 
of youth itself (that is, by displacing youth as a presence). But because meaning 
itself is differential without a positive content, or a structure of reference to which 
the word, term, or concept "youth" may be compared in an affirmative sense, the 
concept of youth becomes a sign, a signifier, whose form and meaning (signified) 
are another sign (another word); or this "meaning" only derives its meaning from 
its role in sentences (discourses), the relations of sentences (discourses), without 
yielding the real thing, so that the "truth" of the meaning, if there is one, lies 
elsewhere. This is the significance of Derrida's ban mot that the thing, the object, 
itself is a sign). This is precisely what we have seen in the case of the meaning 
and form ("use") of the word/concept/term "youth": the sign/signifier "youth" 
exists, and is apparently used and appropriated by heterogeneous discourses and 
institutions, without reference to the transcendental pre-propositions of experience. 
Yet as the work of the analytic philosopher, Donald Davidson, has shown, 
there is no relation of reference that breaks us free 
from the holistic connections within language and 
anchors individual words to things in the world. 
There are no propositions like entities that language 
mirrors, and we cannot steer individual sentences 
into confrontations with the world that make them, 
individually, true or false. There are no meanings a 
grasp of which allows a translator to come to rest 
at finally having brought the other language into 
contact with what is really meant (Farrell 1996: 
256-57. See also Davidson 1984: 73-74; 215-26). 
The implication of all this is that the concept of youth does not stand 
for pre-existing entities (or even pre-existing concepts) but only for a system of 
concepts and forms which organizes the discourses of youth, without ever breaking 
free of this system of difference, and onto an experiential structure of reference, 
onto the empirical entities called "young people". 
Hence we are left with no alternative than to see the concept of youth as 
an inte1pretation, indeed the interpretation of an interpretation, and, in Derridean 
terms, the trace of a trace; for both interpretation and the trace have, to borrow a 
phrase of Belsey's, "no final guarantees elsewhere" (2002: 22). In a word, both 
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the concept and the discourse of youth are rather the production of the free play 
of the signifier, a differential network oftraces8, for as Derrida writes (1976:51), 
"difference cannot be thought without the trace"; that is, they are traces of other 
traces, in an endless chain that never yields the transcendental signified (the 
subjectivity and agency of youth). Which is to say, in other words, that youth 
(both as word, differential concept, and signifier) is a citation, a structure of 
citationality (alluding to something but with what is alluded to being crucially 
different from the allusion itself). Another way of conveying this is to say that 
there is really nothing "behind" the citation; it is nothing but the space on which 
all the "quotations" and "citations" which make up the "discourse of youth" are 
inscribed (as substitute significations)9• 
Nevertheless, we cannot say that youth is wholly and completely the 
product of language. It is also the product of material and social institutions (or 
what may be regarded as material practices and structures), or what, following 
Foucault (1972) we could call "discursive formations", which, he argues, are not 
only made up in languages in use ("statements"; "a system of dispersion") but 
also of "heterogeneous elements". He calls these "practices that systematically 
fom1 the objects of which they speak" (1972: 49). According to Foucault, human 
subjects are produced by discourse or discursive (social) practices, such as for 
example, investigations, talk, and writing by doctors, clergy, novelists, moralists, 
and politicians. These discursive fonnations actually bring about the "thing", 
say madness, sex, etc., 10 they claim to have discovered. It is in this way, for 
example, that the "thing" is constructed by the discourses of social practices and 
institutions. Such discourses give the impression that "the thing" has existed prior 
both to the discourses and the discovery of it. For Foucault, the reverse is the 
case: these discursive practices have in fact constructed "the thing", the object 
(of these discursive practices), in order to analyze, describe and regulate (control) 
the activities of human beings. This control takes many forms, one of which is 
that these discursive practices are repeated across very many and different social-
discursive fields; and they go on from there to "authorize" (produce) a certain 
speech position, construct certain objects and truths, which they would then endow 
with a certain reality, with a ce1iain locutionary determinacy11 • 
This issue connects with Foucault's other central concept, that of"power-
knowledge", what he calls the "relations of domination" that articulate discursive 
practices into a historically specific apparatus, for example, the disciplines, the 
practices of surveillance and control, such institutions as prisons, schools, asylum, 
factories, and sexuality (1980: 194-95). For Foucault, power is a key element in 
discourse in that it is these practices that constitute subjects, for, as he writes, 
"certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, ce1iain desires, came to 
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be identified and constituted as individual". Therefore far from power being a 
repressive apparatus which is imposed outwardly on the subject, the individual, 
the subject, is, rather, Foucault argues," not the vis-a-vis of power [but] one of its ~ 
effects" (1980: 98; my emphasis). 
One implication of this for our discussion is that "youth", even where the 
concept is used with a referential intent, is rather the production of discourse, or, 
indeed, of those "discursive practices" (discursive formations) we have identified 
above, from biological-physiological, psychological, familial, sociological, moral, 
historical, advertising, and masculine discourses. It is these discursive practices 
that have brought youth (both as a collective and as a collective noun) into 
being; and it is these discours.es that have sought to "recruit" youth as a subject 
subjected to their goals, values, and interests; it is these discourses that have 
disciplined youth into a "meaningful" concept (i.e. as anxiety, chaos, boundless 
energy, crime, market, life-style, vital resource, asset, and subject-position, and 
whose sole relevance is the advancement of national and international market 
exchange, political-economic development, and modernization); and finally, it is 
these discourses that have formed "the knowledge" with and within which youth 
becomes the product of the subjugation of objects ("youth bodies"). Which is 
to say, to follow an analogy from Foucault, that the discourse of youth not only 
imposes "canonical bits of knowledge" on young people (as youth) but also uses 
them as a basis for construction a "science", a normativity, that is beyond their 
grasp. All of this together enables the discourse of youth to be, in the words of 
Foucault, an "intensification of the interventions of power to a multiplication of 
discourse"; for the very multiplication and the multiplicity of the discourse of 
youth is, in the last analysis, an "intensification of the interventions of power" in 
the life-knowledge-being of young people, so that even young people themselves 
are subjugated to an object called "youth", that is, are "repeated, renewed, and 
displaced' (Foucault 1981: 70; my emphasis). 
If this is indeed the case, then youth is not a consciously willing subject 
creating its youthness (youthfulness or being-in-itself) 'from a point outside 
discourse; it is not even a self, or a demiurgic subject that has a stance outside 
discourse, but rather as a localized position with it. To this extent, then, the use 
of the concept of youth by the state, the market, sociology, and social policy, 
for example, are decisively and irremediably discursive: youth is a discursive 
construct, an effect of cultural production and symbolic representation, not a 
determinate meaning, or even a subject- position (or a subjective activity). 
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7. The Logic and Politics of Substitution 
The discourse of youth, the notion that youth is, or could be, a subject 
of history, an agent in national development and political participation or 
transformation, the idea that youth is transcendentally real and efficacious, or that 
it is a collective singular subject, is the typical dream of presence, the myth of 
the given, in which reality is directly given to consciousness or to the subject 
(parousia). In the discourse of youth, as I have been using the expression, youth 
is present to itself: it guarantees the discourses of it, statements about it, and 
supplies metaphysical sufficiency and guarantee to the idea that youth is a person, 
a subject of proposition and. action, and the sign of potential or actual collective 
action (national development, youth development, democracy, and political 
participation). 
Now what all these notions foreground is a model of youth as a being 
which is capable of matching its desires and intentions with its potential (future 
leadership, vanguard of national development, progress, etc.). This also means 
that youth is a single, collective subject, a singular entity defined by its (collective) 
singularity. How this so-called collective singular subject is formed materially, 
culturally, linguistically, and discursively is never specified. What is more, such 
a notion of youth does not specify whether its "goal" is social production or only 
instrumental action in league with its nature and purposes. In any case, any model, 
theory, or discourse which privileges one social group as the bearer of society or 
humanity or assumes the existence of an epistemologically transparent structure 
of self or selves which possesses transparent knowledge for determining what is 
or will be, or what would actualize its self-becoming, is a form of the "philosophy 
of the subject"12• 
One philosophic difficulty of this notion is that it is, as Benhabib 
(1986: 135) has pointed out, based on a pre-linguistic model, which proceeds from 
"a reflecting consciousness formulating its intentions and goals". This reductionist 
mode of thinking obscures the extent to which human beings attain their dignity 
as persons wholly within the "shared social world" and through "linguistically 
mediated socialization", not to speak of the cultural-symbolic codes which make 
human beings subjects. And so by a miraculous process, the discourse of youth as 
a collective singularity has turned its object into a pre-linguistic, pre-social, and 
demiurfiic subject (namely that what it is and what it can accomplish in its activity 
are fundamentally independent of all else). 
The flip side of this "messianic" (instrumentalist) notion of youth is 
the politics of collective singularity, a "mode of politics where one group or 
organization acts in the name of the whole" (Benhabib 1986: 347). The obvious 
implications of this are an authoritarian politics in which a singularity or a collective 
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singularity acts in the name of the whole and imposes the normative standards of 
conduct or behaviour (which, in their turn, can foster an attitude of dependence 
and clientalism). Yet the same logic and politics are operative in the notion of 
youth as an empirical subject, or a social-economic patient, needing restitution or 
reconstruction by state institutions such as the National Youth Policy, the Ministry 
of Youth Development, Youth Directorates, the National Youth Service Corps, 
Youth Wings (within political parties), and youth studies in the academia. All this 
proceeds from the assumption that young people (or youth) possess a normativity 
in their empirical manifestation. 
Quite apart from questions of the inherent interpretive indeterminacy of 
action (given the interpretive indeterminacy of the life-world), it is philosophically 
untenable to privilege the particular consciousness, perspectival knowledge, or 
identity of a group or collectivity, first because consciousness is perspectival 
(agents know the world through a human perspective, and make distinctions 
based on the symbolizing systems of socialization), second because knowledge 
is propositional (which makes immediate knowledge impossible, since there is no 
Archimedean point outside discourse), third because experience is always already 
conceptualized (which makes perception subject to multiple interpretations), and 
finally because meaning is immanent (in language, which implies that meaning 
cannot be anchored to extra-linguistic mechanisms such as physiology or 
psychology). 
The implication of this for the discourse of youth is obvious: there is 
no identity of subject and action because one cannot predict in advance what a 
subject or an agent is obliged to do in the light of its subjectivity or "agent-ness" 
(agency). And since no epistemologically transparent selves (can) exist, not to 
speak of self-actualizing collectivities or singular collective subjects, then it is 
a philosophical mistake to assume that there exists a self-knowing organism or 
collective singularity which can act, or transform society, solely on the basis of its 
non-signified self-presence or self-presentness (or self-origination) in relation to 
an action, a goal, or (inherent) purposes. 
Even more important: to claim that a group of persons, youth in this case, 
exist as empirical givens, and as those who have actualized themselves through 
their age or quality (youthfulness, of being young) is to claim that their potential, 
essence, and faculties are identical to their being, existence, action, and doing. 
This, as said previously, leads to the politics of collective singularity, whereby a 
singular or a single collective subject acts on behalf of others, or in the name of the 
whole (humanity, young people, workers, peasants, an ethnic group, etc). There is 
another name for this: messianic collective singularity, for which there is a man, 
a group, a collective, within human society whose strategic position or being or 
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identity or experience uniquely entitles it to represent the whole of society or the 
plurality. 
This, surely, is the secret of all the different kinds of the discourse of 
youth that we have examined: they construct young people as patients, namely 
they are subjected to monetized, bureaucratic, instrumental, administrative, and 
policy-decisions norms of action. All this would only, in the end, impoverish the 
conditions of young people and foster in them an attitude of dependence, which 
would also only further limit, and not enhance, their capacity for autonomous and 
self-creative action. Not only would such instrumentalist conceptions of young 
people seek to reach decisions at their expense (in the long run), not only would 
such limit their normative processes of self-transformation through which they 
may learn to be modern subjects, with a capacity for moral, cultural, and political 
judgement) but would also, while claiming to extend the rights and entitlement 
of young people, actually diminish their unity-in-difference, their plurality, their 
particularity, and their non-identity with respect to the instrumental reason which 
drives the discourses of Youth Policies, from the nation-state (Nigeria) to the 
United Nations. For in the documents and discourses of these institutions, young 
people are hopelessly bureaucratized, rationalized, and turned into the totally 
administered objects of modernization and development. This is why the National 
Youth Policy and others of its kind are no more than the logic of substitution in 
which actually existing men and women are displaced by institutional discourse 
and reifying philosophies of Instrumentalism and Bureaucracy. 
8. Conclusion 
What is left of the concept of youth once it has been shown to be without 
reference to real subjects in the empirical world? The answer is: not a great 
deal. However, it is true that young people exist, that is, as human organisms, 
as persons, to whom intentional predicates can be ascribed. It is also true 
that young people, or youth (as a collective noun), have occupied specific yet 
contradictory positions in the discursive spaces of institutions from the family, 
the state, and the market economy to the "disciplines" of biology, physiology, 
sociology, psychology, and advertising. It is these "discourses" (as heterogeneous 
statements) that have produced and modulated our present image and conception 
of youth. These discourses have not only displaced the real, concrete persons that 
we may regard as young people, but have also produced the modern notion and 
meaning of youth. 
This is why, in the present discourse of youth, the assumed referent, 
young people or whatever youth may mean in reality, now no longer exists. We 
cannot now match the concept "youth" with the object; cannot, in other words, 
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make the concept present to its referent. Thus it is the discourse of youth that is 
now the subject rather than youth itself (as a collection of concrete, living persons 
or individuals) which is, and has become, the object of the concept. In this sense, 
then, the word "youth" is no more than a signifier: it defers the meaning (of youth), 
and, at the same time, takes its place, thereby representing the absence (young 
people, the youth) that it evokes. As such, youth (the totality of the real persons) 
is now a representation (of discourse and of the signifier). 
To this extent, therefore, youth is, as an analytical or explanatory category, 
a vacuous concept, and without any analytic significance, for without it having 
some explanatory force, the concept dissolves into insignificance. And from the 
point of view of whether young people, youth, can be active agents in political, 
social, or national transformation, the best the discourse of youth can sustain is 
the politics of collective singularity in which the needs and interests of a subject 
represent those of others. But once we stress that one cannot assume young people 
as a single empirical subject, or as a normative subject that can be represented by 
one particular group or collective, then the whole conceptual and praxiological 
edifice of the discourse ofyouth collapses into a sign of incoherence. 
In the light of the foregoing arguments, youth cannot be an agency of, or 
for, neither can it (as a collective empirical subject) be mobilized for, an enduring 
political action- from changing the self-identity of human organizations to the 
changing of objective structures either for good or for ill. For if we were to ask the 
-question, "in whose name should young people act?", the answer, surely, would not 
consist in the proposition that it would be in the name of young people themselves, 
or youth itself - fundamentally because, from a logical and practical point of 
view, both the question and its possible answer are, as propositions, incoherent, 
meaningless. 
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NOTES 
1. See the National Youth Policy of Nigeria (2001). Abuja: Federal Government of 
Nigeria. I have.also relied on the "Second Draft Review of the National Youth Policy 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria". (2008; unpublished).These two documents are 
substantially similar. 
2. This kind of critique is also called the "the triple critique" in that it unites conceptual 
criticism and social-historical criticism, evaluation and explanation. It criticizes its 
object of inquiry irr.!he very process of explaining it - so that the task of the critic 
is not just to interpret the object (false and dominatory beliefs and practices) but 
to change it (that i~, to remove its conditions of possibility). Here the conceptual 
fuses into the historicl!l, and vice versa: conceptual or historical change implies social 
and institutional chanke. As a method, meta-critique is an open, non-deterministic, 
analytic, for it offers the greatest range of real (non-utopian) possibilities that might 
be available to the critic, For, more, see Bhaskar (1986) and Bhaskar (1993). 
I, 
3. It should be pointed out that physiologists do not use the concept of"youth" as such 
but that of "puberty" to describe physiological changes in a "developing" human 
organism; while psychologists are likely to use the concept of "adolescence" to 
describe the mental-psychological process of becoming in an adolescent subject. 
4. This should be distinguished from the post-Romantic, post-Enlightenment philosophic 
variety of self-creation championed by Nietzsche in which he suggests that we humans 
should become what we are in the sense of being able to invent ourselves. Here self-
creation is to make a work of art of oneself. It is a "passion for self-reference" and self-
fashioning, the will to give form to oneself, to be the author of one's life. Nietzsche 
suggests further that "we have our highest dignity in our significance as works of art" 
(1967a: 52); that "truth is ugly ... We possess art lest we perish of the truth" (1975: 
435). According to Nietzsche, human beings want to be the poets of their life. For 
more on this, see Eagleton (2007) and Nehemas (1985). 
5. This principle is also suggested by the Principle of Charity; and both assume the 
notion of a common human nature: that, in interpreting the beliefs and interest of 
subjects, we assume a tacit knowledge of the world and human subjects in general, 
for only then can we assume their rationality and the intelligibility of their doings and 
sayings, that is, as agents who are attitudinally and behaviourally rational. For more 
on this, see Callinicos (2007); Macdonald & Pettit (1981); Wiggins (1980). 
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6. Davidson argues that since beliefs and meaning conspire to account for utterances, we 
"cannot infer the belief within having the meaning, and have no chance of inferring 
the meaning without the belief' (1984: 142). 
7. According to Ernst Bloch (cited in Benhabib 1986: 353), social utopia is concerned 
with human happiness, irrespective of any kind of difference between, within, or 
among human individuals, so that there is no place for the weary and the downtrodden. 
So by analogy, the utopia envisaged for youth is a negative one since it would not 
be a utopia at all but a circumscribed relativism based on age-identification, which 
would be incoherent in the discourse of social utopia, or even of natural rights, which 
assumes human dignity. 
8. In fact, according to Derrida (1978: 230), the trace is "the erasure of selfhood" 
and of presence, one's own presence, and is constituted by the disappearance of its 
disappearance. It is not, in other words, "a mortal germ" or a seed, or a substance- all 
of which are, by comparison, immobile and un-corruptible. 
9. In the discourse of youth, the real, young people, are never sufficient in themselves, 
hence the reference, in these discourses, to extra-youth referents such as "development", 
"national reconstruction'', etc. In this case, the very youth or young people, for 
whom the discourse speaks, become what Derrida (1976: 159) calls "supplements", 
"substitute significations". The real "thing" (youth) has vanished and now takes on 
meaning only as a trace (the discursive reconstructions of the discourse of youth) and 
in the invocation of the supplement (young people). In a word, youth has become, as 
an empirical subject, no more than a supplementarity (an addition-substitution) to an 
alien purpose outside the needs of young people qua young people. 
10. I have drastically summarized, and perhaps over-simplified, Foucault's otherwise 
elegant and sophisticated arguments. For a fuller treatment of the subject, and a 
critical review of the notions and concepts of discourse and power-knowledge, see 
Macdonnell (1986) and Mills (1997). 
11. This issue turns on the processes by which hurilans are constituted into subjects. 
For Foucault it is through discursive practices. For Althusser (1971), individuals are 
formed into subjects within "ideology". Yet I think neither proposition denies the 
causally efficacious reality of human beings, their being, by nature, what Bhaskar 
(1994: 105) calls "geo-historical products". 
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12. This has two senses: i) the notion ofa subject, group, or human structure, as being the 
foundation of knowledge, meaning, or an inherent purpose given by nature or natural 
determination; and ii) the notion of a particular group, class, or a collective, or even 
a particular man or woman, for example, Youth, Women, Men, the Proletariat, Party, 
Avant-garde Intellectuals, Third World People or Revolutionaries, or the Leader, as the 
universal hope of human emancipation, as particularity that represents universality. 
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